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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Was P not shown to be the procuring cause of the sale ?7 The
dissent makes no mention of any right of the dealer to a commis-
sion and it is evident that he was not entitled to such, as he was
not an effective cause of the sale, though his efforts may have been
of some value to P.8 According to the dissent, then, D is not liable
for any commission, though the sale was effected by the efforts of
others. The purchaser became the object of a new series of nego-
tiations, begun by the introduction to D by P (all P contracted
to do) which series culminated directly in the sale.
W. G. W.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TAXATION - PowEa OF STATE TO TAx
GROSS RECEIPTS FROM CONTRACTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.-
The Dravo Contracting Company, a Pennsylvania corporation,
contracted with the federal government to construct locks and dams
on navigable rivers in West Virginia. The West Virginia Tax Com-
missioner assessed the Dravo Company upon gross receipts from
the contracts, under the West Virginia statute providing for a tax
of "two per cent of the gross income of the business" of "every
person engaging or continuing within this State in the business of
contracting."' A three-judge district court enjoined the collec-
tion of the tax,2 and the Commissioner appealed. Held (four jus-
tices dissenting), that the tax was valid. Decree reversed. James
v. Dravo Contracting Co.'
7 Hill v. McCoy, 1 Cal. App. 159, 81 Pac. 1015 (1905) (the introduction to
the seller of the purchaser was found to be the procuring cause of the sale) ;
McCampbell v. Cavis, 10 Colo. App. 242, 50 Pac. 728 (1897) (the broker was
held to be entitled to his commission where he had introduced the purchaser
who bought sometime later after acquiring the purchase money); Myers v.
Dean, 10 Misc. 402, 31 N. Y. S. 119 (1894) (the act of bringing the parties
together was held sufficient to entitle the broker to a commission).
8 Mears v. Stone, 44 DI. App. 444 (1892) ; Crain v. Miles, 15- Mo. App. 338,
134 S. W. 52 (1911); Walker v. Van Valkenberg, 291 S. W. 936 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926); Alexander v. Sherwood Co., 72 W. Va. 195, 77 S. E. 1027 (1913)
(Iictum that P may avail himself of the broker's efforts if the broker was un-
successful in his attempts to sell).
1W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 86; W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) § 960 (5),
amending W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 13, § 2.
- Dravo Contracting Co. v. Fox, 16 F. Supp. 527 (S. D. W. Va. 1936).
358 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 125 (1927). The Dravo case was held to be
decisive of Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. Ed. 154
(1937), involving a similar provision of the Washington occupation tax law.
In the Dravo case there was also a question as to the territorial jurisdiction of
West Virginia. And see Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 5 U. S. L.
WVEEK 797-(decided March 7, 1938).
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The superstructure of ramifications erected upon McCulloch
v. Maryland' and its companion case, Collector v. Day,5 is indeed
delicately balanced." The extent to which the equilibrium has been
disturbed by the Dravo case is somewhat doubtful, the opinion be-
ing of such an equivocal nature that it provides ample means of
retreat to the doctrine that the power to tax is the power to de-
stroy,7 but might be used as a steppingstone to a new doctrine of in-
tergovernmental immunities." A comparison with precedent may
tend to prove that the principal case will be somewhat more of a
landmark than some seem to believe.9
(1) If a state has no power to tax receipts from a contract be-
tween the federal government and a telegraph company, 10 how
can it tax receipts from a contract between the federal government
and a contracting company? The Chief Justice, speaking for the
majority of the Court, attempted to distinguish the cases on the
ground that the telegraph company had accepted the terms of a
congressional act permitting such companies to use post roads,
thus giving it a peculiar status in relation to the government; but,
as Mfr. Justice Roberts pointed out in dissent, the true basis of
the telegraph case was that the tax burdened the federal govern-
ment, this being illustrated by other cases in which the same type
of tax was upheld even though the telegraph company had accepted
the terms of the act, because transactions of the United States were
not affected. 1
44 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S, 1819).
r11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (U. S. 1870). Collector v. Day lays down the
rule that the federal government and the states are on an equal basis in so
far as immunity from taxation is concerned.
5 For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the cases, see Note (1938)
51 HAnv. L. REv. 707.
7 Marshall is often misquoted to this effect. What Marshall in fact said in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431, was ..... the power to tax involves
the power to destroy . .
8In nature the opinion is not unlike that parodied by T. R. Powell, An
Imaginary Judicial Opinion (1931) 44 HArtv. L. Rnv. 889.
o See Note (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 707, in which it is said: "In view of
the state of the authorities, it is evident that the Dravo case, with its mild and
hesitant majority opinion and its strongly-worded minority, will be no land-
mark.,
5
10 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. Ed. 1067
(1881).
11 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, 8 S. Ct.
961, 31 L. Ed. 790 (1888); Attorney General of Massachusetts v. Western
Telegraph Co., 141 U. S. 40, 11 S. Ct. 889, 35 L. Ed. 628 (1891).
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(2) Receipts from a contract of sale of gasoline12 or motor-
cycles13 to one governmental unit cannot be taxed by the other.
The Court simply said that the sales tax cases had previously
been distinguished,14 and must be limited to their particular facts;
which may be equivalent to saying that there is no distinction.
Three cases are relied upon to sustain the holding of the Dravo
case. In Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,'5 two consulting engineers
were held to be subject to federal taxation upon net income which
was in part derived from contracts with states and subdivisions of
states. A tax upon net income after all allowable deductions have
been made from the gross differs in degree from a tax upon gross
income, just as a tax upon the property 6 of one making a sale to
the federal government would differ in degree from a tax upon
the receipts under the sale - the burden in the one case being said
to be remote and consequential, in the other, direct. This dis-
tinction between net and gross income taxes is made in the inter-
state commerce field.17 Alward v. Johns 's5 upheld a California
tax upon the gross receipts of an operator of an automotive stage
line, the principal part of such receipts .being derived from a mail-
carrying contract with the federal government. The distinguish-
ing feature of the Johnson case was that the gross receipts tax was
imposed in lieu of all other taxes, hence while the subject of the
tax and the directness of the burden were the same as in the Dravo
case, the measure was vastly different, the exaction in the latter
case being in addition to and not in lieu of other taxes. The third
12Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ez rel. Knox, Att'y Gen., 277 U., S. 218,
48 S. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857, 56 A. L. R. 583 (1928); Graves v. Texas Co.,
298 U. S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 818, 80 L. Ed. 1236 (1936); But see Trinityfarm Con-
struction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 54 S. Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed. 918 (1934),
holding that an independent contractor may be taxed upon gasoline used in
the performance of a contract with the federal government, just as he may
be taxed upon any other property.
13 Indian Motocycle Company v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601,
75 L. Ed. 1277 (1930), holding invalid a federal sales tax as to motorcycles
sold to municipalities.
14 In Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 572,
50 S. Ct. 419, 74 L. Ed. 1047 (1930), a tax was held to be upon transportation,
not upon sale; and in Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U.
S. 383, 57 S. Ct. 239, 81 L. Ed. 294 (1937), 'the tax was held to be upon manu-
facture rather than sale.
15 269 U. S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172, 70 L. Ed. 384 (1925).
16 Taxes upon the property of an independent contractor with the federal
government are upheld. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall 5, 21
L. Ed. 787 (U. S. 1873); Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.
S. 466, 54 S. Ct. 469, 78 L: Ed. 918 (1934).
17 Peck v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432, 62 L. Ed. 1049 (1918).
is 282 U. S. 509, 51 S. Ct. 273, 75 L. Ed. 496, 75 A. L. R. 9 (1931).
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case cited by the Chief Justice was Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mary-
land v. Pennsylvania,0 in which the Attorney General, acting in
pursuance of an act of Congress, authorized the Fidelity Company
to become surety upon bonds of federal officials, and Pennsylvania
levied a gross receipts tax upon the premiums of these bonds. Since
the premiums were paid by the officials, not the federal govern-
ment, obviously the receipts were obtained from the governmental
contract in too indirect a manner to support a contention of con-
stitutional invalidity of the tax.
Since none of the cases relied upon lens anything but the
weakest of support for the Dravo case, and since the Dravo case is
not reconcilable with previous decisions, perhaps there is merit in
Mr. Justice Roberts' statemeni that the judgment seems to over-
rule, sub silentio, a century of precedents, and to leave the appli-
cation of the rule uncertain and unpredictable.
The most interesting feature of the Dravo case is that in the
brief filed by the Solicitor General 0 as amicus curiae it was sug-
gested that the sole criterion of the validity of a tax under the
principle of intergovernmental immunities should be whether or
not the tax is discriminatory. According to Mr. Justice Roberts'
opinion, the Solicitor General was not willing to go so far as to
say that states should be allowed to tax directly property of the
federal government. The extent to which the majority opinion in
the Dravo case adopts the doctrine advocated by the Solicitor
General is not clear, inasmuch as the holding may be based upon
any one or more of four factors, i. e., (1) the taxpayer was an
independent contractor; (2) the tax was nondiscriminatory; (3)
the tax was nQt laid upon the contract of the government; (4)
should the burden of such a tax become too heavy, Congress has
the means of redress.
What is meant by saying that Congress has the means of
redress? It is well-settled that Congress may consent to the levy-
ing by a state of a tax which otherwise would be invalid,2 but
can Congress prohibit an exaction by a state which would otherwise
be valid? If so, would it not be required by Collector v. Day,2 2 as
19 240 U. S. 319, 36 S. Ct. 298, 60 L. Ed. 664 (1916).
20 Now Mr. Justice Reed.
21 Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 18 L. Ed. 229 (U.. S. 1865) ; Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Md. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319, 36 S. Ct. 298, 60 L. Ed.
664 (1916); Baltimore National Bank.v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 209,
56 S. Ct. 417, 80 L. Ed. 586 (1936).
22 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. EI. 122 (U. S. 1870). See note 6, supra,
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1938], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol44/iss3/8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
is suggested by the dissent, that the states should have the same
power as respects federal taxation ? It is significant that the Chief
Justice went out of his way to exhume this doctrine from some
dicta of Chief Justice Chase in Thopson v. Union Pacific Railroad
CO.,=3 and it is not impossible that future cases may bring about a
complete resurrection, but it is submitted that the logic of Collector
v. Day would not, for reasons of political expediency, be carried to
the extent of allowing states to nullify acts of Congress.
The root of the difficulty in the field of intergovernmental im-
munities was aptly stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in a dissenting
opinion in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Knox,2 4 which
overruled the holding of a state supreme court that a tax of one
cent per gallon on retailers of gasoline was valid as applied to sales
to the Federal Government:
"It seems to me that the State Court was right. I should say
plainly right, but for the effect of certain dicta of Chief Justice
Marshall which culminated in or rather were founded upon his
often quoted proposition that the power to tax is the power to
destroy. In those days it was not recognized as it is today that
most of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If
the States had any power it was assumed that they had all power,
and that the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether. But
this Court which so often has defeated the attempt to tax in cer-
tain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go
too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power
to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."
H. A. W., JR.
CORPORATIONS - EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION UNDER STATUTE
CONTINUING DIsSOLvED CORPORATIONS - POWER TO COmmIT ACT
OF BANKRUPTCY. - A, a Virginia corporation, had its charter re-
voked in 1935 for failure to pay its registration fee and franchise
taxes. Thereafter, the corporation continued to carry on business
with no indication that it was winding up its affairs. In November,
1936, B company secured a judgment against A in A's corporate
name, on a debt contracted prior to the charter revocation. In
December, 1936, A made a general assignment for the benefit of
its creditors. Alleging this assignment as an act of bankruptcy,
23 9 WaU]. 579, 19 L. Ed. 792 (U. S. 1870).
24277 U. S. 218, 223, 48 S. Ct. 451, 453, 72 L. Ed. 857, 56 A. L. R. 583 (1928).
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